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when, on page 31, he calls their life "thoroughly respectable and deadly dull." Surely, as compared with the agrarian life about them, theirs was full of romance, world-wide interest and highly colored idealism. Nor is the statement (page 128) sound, that what Marx calls "surplus-value" is evidently what other economists call profit. Marx is often confused and difficult, but Professor Vedder's dismissal of his argument is far too summary, and is unfair to an important chapter in the history of economic thinking. The reviewer also ventures to doubt the truth of the statement (page 328) that on women has been bestowed the finer moral fiber and the higher spiritual endowment. This is popular and sentimental, but difficult to prove. It is to men that all the greater religious impulses must be traced, and in general it seems doubtful whether woman stands morally as high as man. The author's exceedingly frank estimate of Paul raises too many questions for a brief review. But the main charges brought against Paul (pages 455, 456) lie, in the reviewer's judgment, rather against theological misuse of Paul than against Paul himself. The assertion is capable of respectable defence that Paul had practically no speculative theological interests.

The points, however, on which the reviewer finds himself out of harmony with the author are slight compared to his fundamental agreement with the author's clear and sound differentiation of religious and economic values, and his careful assignment of both to their respective places in the unity of life. Each chapter lists a few of the best books on the topic treated, and there is an excellent index at the close.

The main position of the book, that the family is the source of ethical inspiration, and that its ethics must at last encompass the world, is so fundamental that so clear and interesting a restatement of it must be valuable.

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*Criminal Responsibility and Social Constraint.* By ROY MADDING MCCONNELL. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912.—339 pp.

Mr. McConnell's book is divided into three parts. In Part I he treats of the aim of punishment, giving a chapter to each of the five theories, *viz.* expiation, retribution, deterrence, reformation and social utility. He gives a statement of each theory and a good summary of the arguments for and against each, except the social-utility theory, which he champions as the scientific and therefore the correct theory. He does not give any objections to this theory, although the individu-

alist can and does find plenty of them. The individualist would say that society has no right to damage his individuality for the sake of "social well-being." The individual's right is more insistent, more in evidence and, to him at least, of more value than the vague rights of society. The individualist certainly would not consent that an individual be offered up, a recalcitrant sacrifice, upon the communal altar for the social welfare (*cf.* pages 83, 84). He would never, for the good of society, consent to turn over Smith, a fellow-citizen, to a band of blood-thirsty savages, who wrongly accuse Smith of the murder of one of their tribesmen and threaten to destroy the whole community unless Smith is surrendered. If the guiltless Smith wants to offer himself as a voluntary sacrifice to save the community, that is a different matter. The individualist would stoutly maintain that the individual has rights which society is bound to respect. Even the social utilitarian might decide that to buy safety for the community with Smith's life is to pay too dearly for it. Besides, who is to determine social utility? Shall the majority rule? If we accept that easy standard of judgment, we shall find ourselves solemnly sanctioning the magisterial poisoning of Socrates, the crucifixion of Jesus, the mid-winter exile of Roger Williams. I am not trying to overthrow the social-utility theory of punishment. It is, I think, the most tenable theory. I wish only to show that there are objections to this theory which the author should have considered.

Part II, entitled "Freedom in Crime," comprises twelve chapters devoted to a discussion of free will versus determinism. The author is a determined determinist. His argument is repetitious to the point of tedium; but nobody should expect to be highly entertained by metaphysical discussion. The author is neither a materialist nor a fatalist. He holds that character is made up of inherited tendencies plus acquired tendencies. Every experience exerts a modifying influence upon character. The inevitable conclusion is that the criminal commits crime; the fool, folly; the pedagogue, pedagogy; and the philanthropist, philanthropy—each according to his nature. The murderer's deed is necessitated by predetermining causes; so is the deed of the official who hangs the murderer at the bidding of society. Some men violate the laws; other men preach the sanctity of the laws. The latter act is just as "necessary" as the former. Society is but a curiously complicated mechanism, like the solar system, only it is alive and more intricate. This view of humanity cannot be denounced as illogical. The worst that can be said of it is that it is unmoral. At the same time it must be said that Professor McConnell is hardly fair to those who

assert the freedom of the human will. They do not deny the existence of cause and effect. They merely contend that man is free to choose in certain cases. And, however enjoyable it may be as an intellectual exercise to argue about the doctrines of free will and of determinism, it is of little practical value to the lawmaker or the administrator. The advocates of each theory agree that offences against the law must be punished. They agree that rational men are accountable for their deeds; the one says "morally"; the other, "socially." Why, then, introduce philosophical controversy into the field of practical politics? It would be more politic if the criminologist, after stating both views of criminal responsibility in uncontroversial language, should point out how both doctrines lead to the same practical expedients for the discouragement of harmful acts. The active social forces would thereby be encouraged to generate more light and less heat.

Part III, containing chapters 17 to 24, inclusive, is called "Responsibility for Crime." Herein the author proves that determinism is at least as good as the free-will theory as a philosophy of criminal law, for it is shown to sanction the same legislation and the same administration that are sanctioned by free will.

The book contains more metaphysics than criminology. It contains, however, no index, and this even a work on metaphysics ought to have.

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*Quetelet, statisticien et sociologue.* By JOSEPH LOTTIN. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1912.—xxx, 564 pp.

This is a large and erudite volume by the professor of *Moraltheologie* in the University of Louvain. It is a study in historical research and philosophical criticism. As an historical study, it is of very superior quality both as regards exhaustion of sources and judicial impartiality of presentation. Whether one agrees with the general philosophical position or not will doubtless be determined by individual reactions to the questions treated. In the preface the author tells us that his objects are to examine the basis of Quetelet's statistical method in the light of more recent theory; to estimate Quetelet's contributions to the development of sociology; to examine again, with minuteness, Quetelet's theory of freedom of the individual in relation with the social *milieu*; and finally to appraise the value of the concept "average man." The volume appears to the reviewer to be an effort to answer two queries: first, what is the extent of Quetelet's originality; second,